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Abstract: This article introduces and examines Chinese arbitration institutions’
recent movements to expand non-ICSID investment arbitration services, which
could potentially contravene existing relevant Chinese laws and judicial
practice, and it explores the prospects for non-ICSID investment arbitration in
China. The article first compares ICSID and non-ICSID investment arbitration
to determine the differences between them and their respective selling points for
stakeholders in investment disputes. Next, the article examines the diverse
mechanisms involved and highlights the different rules that govern non-ICSID
arbitration, including the rules established by Chinese arbitration institutions in
recent years. The article then further analyzes the obstacles in existing Chinese
legislation and judicial practice that have impeded the use of non-ICSID
investment arbitration in China. Finally, after briefly introducing proposals to
remove these obstacles, the article examines the future prospects for Chinese
non-ICSID investment arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
With the increasing number of investment arbitration treaties,
international arbitration has gradually conquered the investment dispute
resolution market by taking the place of various prior inefficient dispute
resolution methods.1 As a more popular tool for resolving investment
disputes between private investors and host states, international arbitration
is constantly evolving and developing versatile regimes and mechanisms to
fulfill the different demands and respond to feedback and questions from
clients.2 There are generally three types of investment arbitration: 1) the
most frequently used International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) Convention, which includes arbitration regimes registered
under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules; 2) other
frequently used regimes organized under the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules; and 3)
arbitration regimes administered by various international arbitration
institutions under institutional arbitration rules, such as the Arbitration
Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Practitioners have further
classified these three regimes into two categories ICSID and non-ICSID
investment arbitration due to the different rules governing their arbitration
procedures and enforcement of outcomes. With China increasingly
becoming an important player in the world of international economics, the
country has intensively reformed and internationalized its arbitration regime
to capture more of the investment dispute resolution market. This article
introduces and examines Chinese arbitration institutions’ recent movements
toward expanding their non-ICSID investment arbitration services, which
could potentially contravene existing relevant Chinese law and judicial
practice.
The article first compares ICSID and non-ICSID investment
arbitration to examine their differences and respective selling points for
1
CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED), 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 14, 96
(Kluwer Law International, 2009).
2
Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy
and Stability of International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 745 (2008); Vincent
O. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International Convention for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L.
21, 21 (2001).
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stakeholders in investment disputes. Then, this article examines the diverse
mechanisms involved and highlights the different rules that govern nonICSID arbitration, including the arbitration rules established by Chinese
arbitration institutions in recent years. This article then further analyzes the
obstacles in existing Chinese legislation and judicial practice that have
impeded non-ICSID investment arbitration in China. Finally, after briefly
introducing proposals to remove these obstacles, this article examines the
future prospects for Chinese non-ICSID investment arbitration.
2.

ICSID OR NON-ICSID INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism based on the disputants’
mutual consent. In the sphere of investment arbitration, such consent is not
just limited to private investors and host states but can also involve
agreements between home states and host states. Therefore, investor-state
investment arbitration is more complicated than pure commercial
arbitration due to the involvement of multiple parties of interest and
arbitration regimes. There are several situations when stakeholders are
entitled to choose between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. The first is
when investment treaties between home states and host states explicitly
provide for dispute resolution mechanisms, including ICSID and nonICSID arbitration. For example, Article 26(4) of the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) provides for investment arbitration under the ICSID and Additional
Facility Rules, ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or
an arbitration proceeding under the rules of the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.3 The second is when the home state and
host state are both signatories to the ICSID Convention, and the investment
dispute arises from a contractual relationship that includes an arbitration
agreement for a proceeding under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or
administered by an arbitration institution. The third is when disputants are
free to select ICSID or non-ICSID arbitration based on mutual consent.
Although parallel arbitration proceedings are rare, both ICSID and nonICSID arbitration are frequently used to resolve investment disputes.
Furthermore, with the increasing criticism of the ICSID system,
stakeholders are considering non-ICSID arbitration to resolve their
investment disputes more often, and accordingly, more arbitration
institutions are expanding their relevant services.4 Nevertheless, it is
impossible to propose a panacea for stakeholders to choose between ICSID
and non-ICSID arbitration. The two regimes vary widely in many respects
due to their divergent governing rules.
3
The Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100. The treaty was
entered into force April, 16, 1988.
4
MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES § 3.09 (Oxford University Press, 2007); Kaj Hobér, Investment
Treaty Arbitration and Its Future -- If Any, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 58, 60 (2015).
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2.1. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of arbitration tribunals is the cornerstone of such
proceedings. Jurisdiction under the ICSID is described as follows:
[A]ny legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.5

This jurisdictional requirement is referred to as double-tier consent, as
it includes consent between the home state and host state by signing the
ICSID Convention in addition to the consent of the private investors who
submit their disputes to the ICSID. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention
provides several definitions of terms in this rule, including “national of
another Contracting State” and the form of “consent.” The Convention
explicitly excludes the formal diplomatic protection provided by home
states. In addition, even if the home state and host state are not parties to the
ICSID Convention, disputants can still submit their disputes to the ICSID
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.
Jurisdiction under non-ICSID arbitration is also not difficult to
explain. The most widely quoted requirement is provided in Article 2 of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention, NYC), which only requires a written
arbitration agreement for evidence of the parties’ consent to submit their
disputes to arbitration.6 Many states have established more flexible
requirements for the forms of arbitration agreements.7 In addition, it is
widely established that arbitral tribunals are generally entitled to rule on
their own jurisdiction, which is referred to as the “competence-competence”
doctrine. The worldwide atmosphere of favoring international arbitration
has fueled a clear tendency for arbitrators and national courts to confirm
and support arbitral jurisdiction based on evidence of the parties’ explicit or
implicit consent. In the specific area of investment arbitration, the only
“obstacle” to jurisdiction is probably sovereign immunity, which provides
that states that are immune to the jurisdiction of another sovereign.
However, sovereign immunity is easy to overcome in both ICSID and nonICSID arbitration because it can be waived by the states involved through
5
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159, article 25 (hereinafter ICSID Convention). It
entered into force on October 14, 1966.
6
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10,
1958, 330 UNTS 38 (hereinafter New York Convention). It entered into force on June 7,
1959),
7
Anghélos C. Foustoucos, Conditions Required for the Validity of an Arbitration
Agreement, 5 J. OF INT’L ARBITRATION 126, 128 (1988).
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implicit and explicit consent to submit disputes to arbitration.8 In summary,
jurisdiction under both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is clear and easy
to identify with evidence of the disputants’ consent or investment treaties
that designate the relevant dispute mechanisms. The biggest difference in
initiating ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is that ICSID arbitration is
provided for in investment treaties and the ICSID Convention, and it is
ready for use in all qualified disputes that may arise afterward. Non-ICSID
arbitration must be explicitly selected in an arbitration agreement, and it is
generally difficult for private investors to persuade host states to adhere to
such agreements, especially when there is no direct contractual relationship
between them.
2.2. Procedure
Investment disputes involve state parties, public law issues, and
complicated controversies. Both ICSID and non-ICSID arbitral proceedings
rely on mature and well-organized procedural rules to provide smooth
processes. ICSID arbitration complies with the ICSID Rules of Procedure
for Arbitration Proceedings or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
(hereinafter referred to as the ICSID Rules), while most non-ICSID
arbitration is organized under the UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules or various
institutional arbitration rules. Due to limitations on the scope of this
research, this article does not attempt to differentiate between every aspect
of the ICSID Rules and the rules applied in non-ICSID arbitration. These
two sets of arbitration rules generally follow similar dispute resolution
patterns and due process standards, although they have different specific
provisions. Some empirical research has indicated that there is a slight
difference in the average length of ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration
proceedings, which may indicate that one proceeding is more efficient than
another.9 However, such superiority is not clearly evidenced in the text of
the relevant procedural provisions. With slight differences in the number of
days, both sets of arbitration rules provide timely guidelines for different
procedural processes and delegate tribunals ample discretion to coordinate
arbitral proceedings. For example, in non-ICSID arbitration, Article 4 of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that the respondent shall submit a
response to the notice of arbitration within 30 days of its receipt,10 while the
ICSID Rules impose no time limitation on this process but provide that the
8
Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 128 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B)
(2006).
9
Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID
or Not to ICSID, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES VOLUME 14, 285, 317 (Albert Jan van
den Berg ed., 2009).
10 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, (2003).
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requesting party shall propose the appointment of arbitrators within 10 days
after registration of the request.11
Another notable difference is that Article 46 of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules provides that “[t]he award (including any individual or dissenting
opinion) shall be drawn up and signed within 120 days after closure of the
proceeding,” with an optional 60 day extension, while the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules do not impose any limitation on the period for the
tribunal’s decision after closure of the hearings. Even with these
differences, it is not possible to conclude that one procedure is faster or
more efficient than the other, especially considering that the alleged
difference in the average duration of proceedings in one empirical study
was marginal compared to the duration of the entire process.12
In addition, the availability and efficiency of interim measures are
critical factors that are considered increasingly important in evaluating the
effectiveness of a dispute resolution regime. It has been noted that ICSID
and non-ICSID arbitration utilize different interim measure mechanisms.13
However, the differences do not lie in the procedural rules. Both the ICSID
and non-ICSID rules prescribe arbitral tribunals’ authority to issue interim
decisions.14 In non-ICSID arbitration, the parties can also submit a request
for interim measures to the national courts following national laws, while
ICSID arbitration is generally considered to have exempted the jurisdiction
of the national courts, even though Rule 39(6) of the ICSID Rules
specifically states that the parties are allowed to request any judicial or
other authority to order provisional measures based on mutual consent. 15
Notably, in enforcing and executing tribunals’ interim decisions, sovereign
immunity problems are often inevitable, as in the final award enforcement
stage, which will be described in a later section.
As two separate arbitration regimes dedicated to resolving investment
disputes, the differences between the ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration
procedural rules are a matter of course. However, there is no persuasive
evidence to prove that the relevant differences have resulted in different
levels of effectiveness in resolving disputes. Furthermore, the two regimes
are continuously developing and cross-fertilizing each other. UNCITRAL
established the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based
11 International Centre for Settlement of International Disputes, ICSID Convention,
Regulations and Rules (Apr. 10, 2006).
12 GAETAN VERHOOSEL, supra note 9, at 306.
13 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Legal Framework, in
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED), 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 14 95,145
(Kluwer Law International, 2009).
14 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Article 47; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra
note 10, Article 26.
15 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Article 39; ETI Euro Telecom International BV v.
Republic of Bolivia, EWCA Civ 880 (2008).
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Investor-State Arbitration (“the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules”), which
have been widely praised in practice.16 The ICSID recently published
Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, which specifically increased
the transparency requirements in the Arbitration Rules (including the
Additional Facility Rules), in response to relevant criticism.17
2.3. Annulment or Set Aside
Proponents frequently describe the ICSID arbitration regime as selfcontained and autonomous because the ICSID Rules delegate the authority
for initiating ICSID arbitral proceedings and supervising the awards in the
ICSID system.18 The only supervision mechanism is an annulment review
by an ad hoc Committee of three people constituted based on Article 52 of
the ICSID Convention. This annulment process does not work as an appeals
system in which the appellant authority can revise a previous award based
on its own discretion. The ad hoc committee can only annul previous
awards on the exclusive grounds provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention.19 After awards have been fully or partially annulled, the parties
can submit the dispute to a new tribunal and restart the arbitral
proceedings.20 Academics have noted that the drafters of the ICSID
Convention believed that finality and the procedural integrity of the system
was more valuable than substantive correctness; thus, the relevant provision
only provides for a limited and extraordinary remedy for arbitral awards.21
The supervision mechanism in non-ICSID arbitration is a different
story. As with commercial arbitration, two types of jurisdictions hold vital
positions in the execution of effective judicial supervision in the post award
stage. The first is ‘primary jurisdiction’, where the arbitration is held, while
the second is ‘secondary jurisdiction’, where the arbitral award is
enforced.22 In traditional ‘seat’ theory,23 national courts have primary
jurisdiction and are entitled to set aside arbitral awards, which invalidates
16

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/
Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf (last visited September 22, 2018).
17 Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules, available at https://icsid.worldbank.
org/en/Documents/Amendments_Vol_One.pdf (last visited September 22, 2018).
18 JOHN CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, The Evolution of the ICSID System as an Indication of
What the Future Might Hold, in ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED), INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW AGE? ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 17, 565
(Kluwer Law International, 2013).
19 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, article 52.
20 Id.
21
Kateryna Bondar, Annulment of ICSID and Non-ICSID Investment Awards:
Differences in the Extent of Review, 32 J INT’L ARB. 621, 676 (2015); RUDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 279 (Oxford, 2008).
22 Id.
23 F.A. MANN & LEX FACIT ARBITRUM, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM
FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157, 159 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1967).
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the awards per se and makes them unenforceable everywhere, while under
secondary jurisdiction, national courts can only refuse to recognize or
enforce arbitral awards. Thus, many academics contend that the authority
granted under primary jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award is the most
effective mechanism for the supervision of an international arbitration
process.24 Based on this consideration, many international and national laws
prescribe the authority of national courts with primary jurisdiction and the
grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. Some international rules have
attempted to unify the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. For
example, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law25 and Article IX of the
1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
(hereinafter the European Convention of 1961)26 stipulate detailed grounds
for setting aside arbitral awards. In practice, national courts are more
inclined to review awards based on their own national provisions.27
Lacking uniform international grounds for setting aide arbitral awards
not only greatly increases the uncertainty in non-ICSID arbitration but also
makes it difficult to evaluate and compare the review standards under
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration. Thus, forum shopping is inevitable.
States that provide more internationalized and arbitration-friendly set-aside
grounds are more popular as arbitration forums than those states that exert
rigorous scrutiny on arbitral awards. Empirical data may add another
perspective to this comparison. One study found that the annulment ratio in
the case of ICSID awards was significantly higher than the set-aside ratio
for non-ICSID treaty awards.28 While admitting that the population was too
small to serve as a basis for any broad conclusions, the research identified
some underlying reasons for this measurable difference, such as divergent
review standards, inconsistencies inherent in the ICSID system, and the
widely used forum shopping in non-ICSID arbitration.29 In practice, the
ICSID annulment process received substantial criticism, particularly with
respect to its consistency and transparency, which ultimately led to a
24

W. Michael Reisman, SYSTEM OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 140,127-8 (1992).
25 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model
Law], WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, U. N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008), Article 34
& Article 36 (1)(a)(v).
26 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION OF 1961
[hereinafter European Convention of 1961] (April 21, 1961), UNTS vol. 484, p. 364 No.
7041 (1963-1964).
27 Meng Chen & Chengzhi Wang, Vanishing Set-Aside Authority in International
Commercial Arbitration, 18 INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 131, 158 (2018).
28 Of the fifteen ad hoc committee decisions, forty percent led to annulment: twenty
percent annulled the entire award and twenty percent were partial annulments. Of the sixteen
court decisions, only one (six percent of the total) led to a set-aside of an award, and even
that was only partial. Gaetan Verhoosel, supra note 5.
29 Gaetan Verhoosel, supra note 5.
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backlash against investment dispute resolution under the ICSID regime.30
2.4. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The enforcement of awards rendered under the ICSID is governed by
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States (Washington Convention),31 while most
enforcement of non-ICSID awards is governed by the New York
Convention.32 The most significant selling point for ICSID arbitration is its
delocalization and self-contained enforcement mechanism.33 According to
the ICSID Convention, the contracting States are obliged to recognize and
enforce awards as if they were a final judgment of a court in their territory,
without any prior review on the basis of their national laws.34 Failure to
comply with this provision constitutes breach of bilateral and multilateral
treaty obligations, e.g., those contained in BITs and in the ICSID
Convention. Therefore, the enforcement of ICSID awards is generally not a
serious problem, and voluntary payment is the ordinary practice.35
Notably, to avoid repetitive remedies, Article 27 prevents the
contracting states from providing formal “diplomatic protection” or
bringing an “international claim” based on an investment dispute.36 In
addition, noncompliance with a rendered award can be remedied through
the use of Article 64, which enables the contracting state of an investor to
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).37 In addition
to the enforcement mechanisms provided for in the ICSID Convention,
scholars and practitioners have explored many other instruments to enhance
the enforcement of ICSID awards, including utilizing World Bank facilities
30 THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
(Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010); Brigitte
Stern, The Future of ICSID, Ad Hoc Committees, Appelate Tribunals, International
Investment Courts and Investment Arbitration: Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THE COMING OF A NEW AGE?, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES, VOLUME 17, 559-562
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2013); Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New
Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2003).
31 CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES [hereinafter Washington Convention] March 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, Article 25(1).
32 New York Convention, supra note 6.
33 Giuliana Cane, The Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Revolutionary or Ineffective? 15
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 439, 455 (2004).
34 Katharina Diel-Gligor, Competing Regimes in International Arbitration: Choice
Between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 677 (2011).
35 Antonio Parra, The Enforcement of ICSID Arbitral Awards, 24th Joint Colloquium on
International Arbitration (Paris, Nov. 16, 2007), 1&3, retrieved from http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/0/12144885278400/enforcement of_icsid_awards.pdf (last visited September
19, 2018); Lucy Reed, Jan Paulsson & Nigel Blackaby, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 107
(2004).
36 ICSID Convention, supra note 5, Article 27.
37 Katharina Diel-Gligor, supra note 34.
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and relevant political influence.38 For example, one commentator suggested
that the World Bank could punish noncompliance with investment
arbitration awards through indirect means by suspending financing to the
noncompliant member, similar to the penalties incurred by members for
nonpayment of World Bank loans.39 Political approaches are not new
instruments for resolving investment disputes, as they have proven to be
inefficient and sometimes can increase the illegitimacy in investment
disputes. The birth of the ICSID and other alternative resolution methods
was aimed at taking the place of traditional investment dispute resolution
mechanisms by establishing a uniform and fair international regime.
Politicalizing the enforcement of ICSID awards seems to contradict the
general purpose of the ICSID Convention.
After entering into force, the New York Convention successfully
established a uniform worldwide enforcement regime for international
arbitral awards. Enforcement courts can only refuse recognition and
enforcement of qualified arbitral awards based on the grounds exclusively
provided for in Article 5 of the New York Convention.40 Although the
enforcement regime under the New York Convention is generally
considered to be efficient, national courts inevitably and unsurprisingly
accept jurisdiction and decide controversial issues in accordance with their
own national laws and procedures, which results in uncertainty and
inconsistency in outcomes.41 More controversially, court decisions may also
be influenced by local legal, cultural, economic, and political systems.
Therefore, the enforcement regime for non-ICSID awards under the New
York Convention is generally considered less favorable than the
Washington Convention.
In addition, there is one common obstacle in the enforcement of both
ICSID and non-ICSID awards, which is the sovereign immunity defense in
the enforcement stage. Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine that
prohibits the national courts of one state from exercising jurisdiction over
other states.42 This doctrine further extends to the execution process, which
indicates that states’ assets are immune to the execution of any other state’s
authority. By signing a BIT or contract designating arbitration as the
38

LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, supra note 35, at 5.
Joseph M. Cardosi, Precluding the Treasure Hunt: How the World Bank Group Can
Help Investor Circumnavigate Sovereign Immunity Obstacles to ICISID Award Execution,
41 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 162-63 (2013).
40 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at
327 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1981); RICHARD B. LILLICH & CAHRLES N.
BROWER, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION”
AND UNIFORMITY 38 (Transnational Publishers, 1992).
41 Julian D M Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine The International
Arbitration Process? 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 498 (2009).
42 DHISADEE CHAMLONGRASDR, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY AND ARBITRATION 69-70
(Cameron May Ltd., 2007) (asserting that when states conduct commercial acts, the
rationales for sovereign immunity no longer apply).
39
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dispute resolution mechanism, a state is considered to have waived its
immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts for proceedings
concerning the arbitral process.43 However, jurisdictional immunity and
execution immunity are generally considered separate; most countries
currently do not extend such jurisdictional immunity to execution
proceedings.44 Therefore, stakeholders frequently find themselves having to
revisit the sovereign immunity defense in the enforcement stage. Neither
the New York Convention nor the Washington Convention addresses the
issue of sovereign immunity defenses to the enforcement or execution of
awards rendered pursuant to the treaty. This omission is explicit in the
Washington Convention, which provides that the domestic law of immunity
is not affected by the provisions of the Convention.45 The New York
Convention does not explicitly address the issue of sovereign immunity, but
enforcement courts have refused enforcement based on its rationale
according to either the “commercial character reservation” or “public policy
doctrine” provided in Article 1(3) and Article 5 of the New York
Convention, respectively.46 Some enforcement courts have even
refused to find that its national provisions specifically abrogate sovereign
immunity in execution proceedings.47 Many commentators have declared
sovereign immunity to be the most significant deficiency in the
enforcement of arbitral investment awards. Considering the fragmented
national laws regarding the issue of sovereign immunity in execution, some
states have persisted with an absolute immunity doctrine; thus, establishing
a uniform international approach to settle the sovereign immunity defense
in the enforcement of arbitral investment awards is impractical in the near
future.48 One approach is that some states have shifted from traditional
doctrines of the absolute immunity of states to a restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity,49 which holds that sovereign immunity can be
43 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 128 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)(B)
(2006).
44 Alexis Blane, Sovereign Immunity As Bar to the Execution of International Arbitral
Awards, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 453, 505, n. 23 (2009).
45 Alexis Blane, supra note 44, at 461.
46 Hazel Fox, State Immunity and the New York Convention, in ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 829, 829-32 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro eds.,
2008).
47 Alexis Blane, supra note 44, at 462.
48 August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from
Enforcement Measures, 17 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 803 (2006); CHAMLONGRASDR, supra note
42.
49 Alexis Blane, supra note 44, at note 20 (“[I]n adopting a restrictive theory, the
International Law Commission traces this evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
various countries. The restrictive theory began in Italy, Belgium, and Egypt and spread
throughout the developed world. Countries in the developing world have also been adopting
the restrictive approach, though not all have done so, and the codifications of sovereign

259

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

39:249 (2019)

overcome when a state engages in commercial activities.50 Many decisions
made by courts located in the United States and Europe have upheld this
tendency, although with divergent standards for identifying “commercial
activities”.51
2.5. Summary
Unlike ICSID arbitration, in which decisions are published and
updated by the ICSID in a timely manner, non-ICSID arbitration cases are
more confidential and difficult to statistically analyze because they are
administered by different authorities, and most non-ICSID arbitration
regimes that hear investor-state disputes do not maintain a public registry.52
Several empirical studies have attempted to compare the popularity of
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration for investment dispute resolution.
Although the numbers may vary slightly, it is generally understood that
ICSID arbitration has a longer history and has a much larger share of the
investment dispute resolution market. For example, prior to 2007, empirical
data indicated that nearly 74.4% of such decisions were rendered under the
ICSID (59.8% under the ICSID Convention and 14.6% under the ICSID
Additional Facility), and the remaining 25.6% were resolved under either
the SCC or other ad hoc rules.53 The ratio has fluctuated slightly in recent
years, but the ICSID still administers a major proportion of all investment
arbitration proceedings.54 Some studies have attempted to explore the
reasons why one arbitration system might be prioritized over another.
Examinations and comparisons of factors such as subject matter, amounts
claimed, amounts rewarded, and identities of winners did not provide clear
evidence proving that there are major differences between the two
regimes.55 There is certainly no clear evidence proving that ICSID
arbitration is faster or more favorable to certain disputants than other
arbitration forums. Comparisons between the procedural rules that are
applied in ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration have found several differences
with regard to jurisdiction, interim measures, and supervision mechanisms.
However, empirical data indicate that the different governing rules do not
result in major differences in their effectiveness in resolving investment
immunity have not been uniform.”).
50 CHAMLONGRASDR, supra note 42, at 69-70.
51 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1, at 36 (1991), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/commentaries/4_1_1991.pdf.
52 Katharina Diel-Gligor, supra note 34.
53
UNCTAD, Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/isds (last visited September 19, 2011).
54 UNCTAD, Latest Development in Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement, IIA Monitor No.
1, 1 et seq., https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20113_en.pdf (2011).
55 Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration
Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825, 914 (2011)
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disputes. Non-ICSID arbitration is thus a workable option for resolving
investment disputes.
3.

VARIABLE NON-ICSID INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
Many entities provide investment dispute resolution services based on
their respective rules. Even the ICSID frequently provides administrative
assistance to investor-state arbitration proceedings under the UNCITRAL
Rules, free trade agreements, and other ad hoc dispute settlement
provisions.56 In addition to administering UNCITRAL arbitrations, the
ICSID has also assisted with the organization of hearings in arbitration
proceedings conducted under the auspices of the ICC, LCIA, PCA, and
other institutions.57 Among the various institutions that administer
investment arbitration proceedings, the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Rules are the third
most commonly used set of arbitration rules in investment disputes, making
the SCC the second largest arbitration institute in the world, after the
ICSID, for the administration of investment disputes.58 Given the backlash
against the ICSID system and the continued development of international
investment, more and more international institutions have endeavored to
obtain a share of the investment dispute resolution market. Three Chinese
arbitration institutions have published their own investment arbitration rules
to test the market in the last two years. Although neither has administered a
real case yet, nor have the obstacles that exist in Chinese legislation and
judicial practice been overcome to support the national “Belt and Road”
policy, the entire Chinese arbitration community has begun to discuss
whether the country has reached the moment for it to embrace non-ICSID
arbitration.

56 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload-Statistics, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources
/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx, (last visited September 20, 2018). The Centre’s services in
these proceedings range from support with the organization of hearings to administrative
services comparable to those provided in ICSID cases. The Secretariat also acts as
appointing authority, and decides proposals for disqualification of arbitrators, upon request.
57 Id.
58 Nils Eliasson, Chapter 2 Stockholm as a Forum for Investment Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 25-52 (Ulf Franke &
Annette Magnusson et al. eds., 2013); “By 31 December 2012, 369 arbitration cases had
been registered under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, 1965 (the ICSID Convention) (also known as the
Washington Convention) and 41 ICSID Additional Facility arbitration cases. In comparison,
135 known cases had been filed under the UNCITRAL Rules and 57 cases had been filed
under the Rules of Arbitration of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC Rules). To date, only eight investment arbitrations have been filed under
the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Rules).”
UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA No 1 Mar. 2013.
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3.1. Institutional or UNCITRAL Rules
After the ICSID Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are the
second most frequently used investment arbitration mechanisms. Due to the
complexity of investment disputes, some investment arbitration proceedings
administered under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules still rely on the
assistance of certain institutions. Such assistance ranges from support in
organizing hearings to acting as the appointing authorities and deciding on
proposals for the disqualification of arbitrators. In 2017, the SCC
administered eight investment treaty arbitration cases, six of which were
organized according to the SCC Arbitration Rules, one was under the
UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules, and one was an Emergency Arbitration.59 In
total, the SCC has administered 100 investment treaty disputes, with 74%
administered under the SCC Rules, 21% under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, and 5% under ad hoc rules.60 Similar to the UNCITRAL, the SCC
has not established arbitration rules specifically tailored to investment
arbitration, which means that an arbitration proceeding in which the dispute
concerns a claim based on an investment protection agreement is initiated
in the same way as an ordinary commercial arbitration proceeding. This
section compares the UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules with the SCC
Arbitration Rules to explore the fitness of applying traditional commercial
arbitration regimes to resolve investment disputes.
Both the SCC and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide detailed
provisions regulating each process of an arbitral proceeding, from
commencement of the arbitration, to rendering arbitral awards. Both rules
set timely guidelines for the duration of each process and delegate broad
discretion to arbitral tribunals to coordinate the arbitral proceedings. In
addition to differences in technical rules regarding cost calculations and
time periods, other significant differences between the SCC and
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules include the following:
1) Consolidation of arbitration: Article 12-14 of the SCC Arbitration
Rules govern the involvement of additional parties, multiple contracts and
other arbitration proceedings into a single proceeding, while the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not include a similar provision. Although
consolidating arbitration proceedings entails several practical difficulties, it
can significantly decrease the costs and promote the settlement of multiple
related disputes.61 The effectiveness of its application in investment
59 SCC, Home Statistics Investment Disputes 2017, https://sccinstitute.com/statistics/
investment-disputes-2017/ (last visited September 19, 2018).
60 Id.
61 Michael F. Hoellering, Consolidated Arbitration: Will it Result in Increased
Efficiency or an Affront to Party Autonomy?, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 41 (1997); Julie C. Chiu,
Consolidation of Arbitral Proceeding and International Arbitration, 7 JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 53-76 (1990); D. T. Hascher, Consolidation of Arbitration by
American Courts: Fostering or Hampering International Commercial Arbitration?, 1. J. Int.
Arb. 127, 133-38 (1984); T. J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The
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arbitration proceedings is uncertain, but many institutions have added
similar provisions to their arbitration rules in recent years, which implies
that there is a potential market for this service.62
2) Appointing authority: As arbitration rules designed for ad hoc
proceedings, UNCITRAL does not have a permanent body to provide case
administration services; instead, it delegates appointing authorities to
facilitate arbitral proceedings. The parties can select the appointing
authorities for their case, and the Rules also designate the SecretaryGeneral of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague (hereinafter
called the “PCA”) as the default appointing authority in cases where the
parties cannot reach an agreement. The functions of appointing authorities
include appointing arbitrators pursuant to Articles 8, 9, 10 or 14 of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and deciding on challenges to arbitrators.63
The SCC Arbitration Rules designate the board of directors (the “Board”)
of the SCC for similar functions.
3) Place of arbitration: The significance of the forum for international
arbitration proceedings cannot be understated. It determines the national
procedural laws that govern the arbitral proceedings and the competent
national courts that have the authority to set aside awards. The parties are
free to agree on the forum. If they cannot reach an agreement, the SCC and
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules delegate the Board and the arbitral tribunal,
respectively, to decide the place of arbitration.64
4) Time limit for final award: Article 43 of the SCC Arbitration Rules
requires that the arbitral tribunal render the final award no later than six
months from the date the case was referred to it, with optional extensions
granted by the Board, while the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules do not have
similar requirements. The ICSID Convention also sets a 120-day limit for
final awards.65
5) Exclusion of liability: Both sets of rules exempt arbitrators,
appointing authorities and any expert appointed by the arbitral tribunal from
liability for any act or omission in connection with the arbitration, with the
exception of intentional wrongdoing.66 The SCC Arbitration Rules extend
this exemption to the SCC and its administrative secretary but with the
exceptions of international misconduct and gross negligence.67
6) Emergency arbitrators: The SCC established a set of rules for the
Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 495–508 (1987).
62 Chen Meng, Emerging Internal Control in Institutional Arbitration, 18 CARDOZO
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 295 (2016).
63 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 6.
64
SCC Arbitration Rules, available at https://sccinstitute.com/media/169838/
arbitration_rules_eng_17_web.pdf (last visited September 19, 2018), Article 25;
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 18.
65 ICSID Convention, supra note 5.
66 UNCIRTAL Arbitration Rules, art. 16; SCC Arbitration Rules, Article 52.
67 ICSID Arbitration Rules, rule 46.
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appointment of arbitrators for emergency decisions.68 Data indicate that
emergency arbitrators are occasionally used in investment arbitration
proceedings; for example, the SCC administered one emergency investment
arbitration proceeding in 2017.69
7) Specific rules for investment arbitration: Although the SCC does
not have a specific set of rules for investment arbitration, it has added
several provisions that are specifically applied in such proceedings. These
provisions mainly govern submissions by non-disputing treaty parties or a
third person.70 Notably, the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules include
similar provisions.
8) UNCITRAL Transparency Rules: The UNCITRAL Transparency
Rules, which came into effect on April 1, 2014, are a set of procedural rules
that provide for transparency and public accessibility in treaty-based
investor-state arbitration. The Transparency Rules are not limited to
arbitration proceedings conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
and are also available for use in investor-state proceedings initiated under
rules other than the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or in ad hoc
proceedings. After the Rules were published, they received many positive
comments from practitioners.71 Later, the United Nations Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor–State Arbitration (the Mauritius
Convention) was opened for signatures on March 17, 2015. In contrast, the
SCC Arbitration Rules provide that the proceedings are generally
confidential, if the parties do not agree otherwise.72
3.2. Emerging Investment Arbitration Market in China
Non-ICSID investment arbitration remains a closed market in China.
Three Chinese arbitration institutions have attempted to explore the
provision of investment arbitration services. The first was the Shenzhen
Court of International Arbitration (SCIA), located in Shenzhen, Guangdong
Province. The SCIA was the southern subunit of the largest Chinese
arbitration institution, the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIEATC), declaring itself independent of the
CIEATC in 2012 and changing its name to the SCIA.73 In late 2017, the
68

SCC Arbitration Rules, Appendix II.
SCC, Home Statistics Investment Disputes 2017, available at https://sccinstitute.com/
statistics/investment-disputes-2017/ (last visited September 19, 2018).
70 SCC Arbitration Rules, Appendix III.
71 William Kenny, Transparency in Investor State Arbitration, 33 J. OF INT’L
ARBITRATION 499-500 (2016); Loretta Malintoppi & Natalie Limbasan, Living in Glass
Houses? The Debate on Transparency in International Investment Arbitration, 2 BCDR
INT’L ARBITRATION REV. 36, 57 (2015); GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 2816 (Kluwer Law International, 2014).
72 ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE SCC, ARBITRATION RULES 2017, Article 3 (2017)
https://sccinstitute.com/media/293614/arbitration_rules_eng_17_web.pdf.
73 Chen Meng, Is CIETAC Breaking Apart? An Analysis of the Split in the CIETAC
69
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SCIA merged with another local arbitration institution, the Shenzhen
Arbitration Commission.74 The newly organized institution is still in a
transitional period. The SCIA revised its arbitration rules in 2016 and added
“arbitration cases related to investment disputes between states and
nationals of other states” to its jurisdiction.75 The other SCIA Arbitration
Rules are similar to other institutional arbitration rules and are applied
indistinguishably in both traditional commercial arbitration and investment
arbitration proceedings administered by the SCIA. In addition, the SCIA
has also administered arbitration cases subject to the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules. Theoretically, the SCIA can administer investment
arbitration cases under both the SCIA and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
However, two years after the promulgation of the new SCIA Arbitration
Rules, the SCIA still has not received a single investment arbitration
request. The underlying reasons for this will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Another arbitration institution that tested the investment arbitration
market in China had a similar experience. The CIETAC was established by
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in
Beijing in 1956.76 With its headquarters in Beijing, the CIETAC established
the South Sub-Commission in Shenzhen, the Shanghai Sub-Commission,
the Tianjin International Economic and Financial Arbitration Center
(Tianjin Sub-Commission), and the Southwest Sub-Commission in
Chongqing.77 The CIETAC rapidly developed into the busiest arbitration
institution in the world. Notably, in 2012, the South Sub-Commission and
the Shanghai Sub-Commission announced their independence from the
CIETAC headquarters in Beijing.78 After this split, the CIETAC
reestablished offices in Shanghai and Shenzhen and opened a new branch in
Hong Kong. In 2017, the CIETAC published the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission International Investment
Arbitration Rules (For Trial Implementation) (CIETAC Investment
Arbitration Rules), which were effective on October 1, 2017. In contrast to
the SCIA, the CIETAC decided to establish a specific set of rules for
investment arbitration cases. In its guidelines, the CIETAC explained that,
although Chinese arbitration law limits the application of arbitration to
disputes between private parties, the entire Chinese arbitration community
System, 6(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 107 (2013).
74 Press Release, SCIA Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (Shenzhen
Arbitration Commission) Announcement (Jan. 8, 2018) http://www.sccietac.org/web/news/
detail/1723.html.
75
SCIA, ARBITRATION RULES, Article 2 (Dec. 1, 2016) http://www.sccietac.org/web/
doc/view_ rules/861.html.
76 About Us Page, CIETAC, http://www.cietac.org/index.cms (last visited September
19, 2018).
77 Id.
78 Meng, supra note 73.
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has realized the significant potential of the Chinese investment arbitration
market due to rapidly increasing foreign direct investment involving
Chinese parties. Several international institutions are able to provide
investment arbitration services, including the ICSID, SCC, and ICC.
However, the relevant practice still takes place in a vacuum in China.
Therefore, as the leader of the Chinese arbitration community, the CIETAC
has attempted to become a pioneer in the development of non-ICSID
investment arbitration in China and has clearly demonstrated its preparation
by drafting its investment arbitration rules. In 2019, Beijing Arbitration
Commission (BAC) followed the CIETAC’s model of expanding
investment arbitration service by publishing its own draft of investment
arbitration rules. Most of the provisions are modeled on the UNCITRAL
and other institutional arbitration rules, although the following are
noteworthy:
1) Combination of arbitration and mediation: Almost all Chinese
arbitration institutions have abundant experience combining mediation and
arbitration cases due to the wide application and acceptance of mediation to
resolve disputes.79 This preference is manifested in both the CIETAC
Investment Arbitration Rules and the SCIA Arbitration Rules.80
2) Transparency: In response to “legitimacy” questions regarding
investment arbitration proceedings, the CIETAC Investment Arbitration
Rules incorporate transparency requirements modeled on the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules. For example, Article 55 of the CIETAC Rules
provides that the CIETAC can publish information about arbitral
proceedings unless otherwise agreed by the parties. The Rules also include
provisions governing submissions made by non-disputing parties and a
third person.
3) Third-party funding (TPF): Research has shown that arbitration
cases regularly involve third-party funding.81 The involvement of TPF
presents various challenges to many aspects of an investment arbitral
proceeding, including: conflicts of interest, disclosure rules, and arbitration
costs.82 There are currently few investment arbitration rules that include
specific provisions related to TPF. Article twenty-seven of the CIETAC
Rules defines the allowable scope of TPF in investment arbitration
proceedings. It requires compulsory disclosure of the existence and nature
79 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: Why
it Works in China, 25(4) J. INT’L ARB. 479, 480-86 (2008).
80 CIETAC, ARBITRATION RULES, Article 43 (Nov. 4, 2014) http://www.cietac.org/
Uploads/201902/5c6148b100105.pdf.
81
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA REPORTS NO. 4:
REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ICCA REPORTS SERIES, 203 (2018) https://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/10/40280243154551/icca_reports_ 4_tpf_final_for_print_5_april.pdf.
82 Nadia Darwazeh & Adrien Leleu, Disclosure and Security for Costs or How to
Address Imbalances Created by Third-Party Funding, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 125, 125 (2016).
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of TPF as soon as a TPF agreement is concluded and instructs tribunals to
take TPF into consideration when awarding the costs of arbitration.83
4) Place of arbitration: In contrast to other investment arbitration
rules that delegate tribunals or other authorities to decide the forum for
proceedings when the parties cannot reach an agreement, the CIETAC
Rules stipulate, “where the parties have not agreed on the place of
arbitration, the place of arbitration shall be the domicile of the IDSC or the
CIETAC Hong Kong Arbitration Center that administers the case.”84 In
fact, officials with the CIETAC recommend that stakeholders select Hong
Kong as the place for investment arbitration to avoid application of the
ambiguous and unfavorable Chinese Arbitration Law, the details of which
will be described in the next chapter.
4. PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO NON-ICSID ARBITRATION IN
CHINA
The underlying reasons why only three arbitration institutions out of
approximately 250 such institutions in China have explored providing
investment arbitration services and neither of them have actually received
any investment arbitration requests after publishing relevant rules are
deeply rooted in Chinese legislation and judicial practice regarding nonICSID arbitration. The arbitration market in China is currently flourishing
compared to the country’s outdated arbitration legislation and judicial
system.85 Although the Chinese judicial system, which is led by the
Supreme People’s Court (SPC), has published a series of judicial
interpretations to reform the country’s arbitration regime on issues such as
ad hoc arbitration and judicial supervision and enforcement of arbitral
awards, it has not yet properly addressed the subject of non-ICSID
investment arbitration. In addition, no Chinese parties have been reported to
have participated in any non-ICSID arbitration proceedings. Thus, to
develop non-ICSID investment arbitration services, the obstacles in China’s
legislation and judicial systems must be overcome.
4.1. Jurisdiction
Article 2 of the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China
(Chinese Arbitration Law, CAL) stipulates “[c]ontractual disputes between
citizens of equal status, legal persons and other economic organizations and
83 CIETAC, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION RULES, Article 27 (Sept. 12, 2017) http://www.
cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=390&l=en.
84
CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules, Article 28.
85 In 2015, for example, arbitration institutions located in mainland China administered
136,924 arbitration cases in total, 2,085 of which were foreign-related arbitrations. The total
disputed monetary amount reached 411.2 billion RMB. CHINA ACADEMY OF ARBITRATION
LAW, CHINESE ARBITRATION ANNUAL REPORT 2015, 26-30 (China Academy of Arbitration
Law, 2016).
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disputes arising from property rights may be put to arbitration,”86 which is
generally interpreted as excluding investment disputes between private
investors and host states. In addition, China declared a commercial
reservation when the country joined the New York Convention, which
means that China applies the Convention only to differences arising out of
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered
commercial under its national law. Whether investment disputes between
investors and host states are considered commercial at the international
level is subject to debate.87 Article 2 of the Notice of the Supreme People’s
Court on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China explicitly
stipulates:
In accordance with the commercial reservation declaration made by
China upon its accession to this Convention, China will apply the
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered commercial under the national law
of the People’s Republic of China… except disputes between foreign
investors and the host government.88
Therefore, even though there may be arbitration agreements between
investors and host states, as long as Chinese law is the governing law of the
arbitration agreement, non-ICSID investment arbitration is impracticable,
and enforcement courts may refuse to enforce arbitral awards.
4.2. Procedure
In addition to obstacles to arbitrability, due to the complexity of
investment disputes, the parties normally select existing arbitration rules to
govern their arbitral proceedings. As a highly autonomous dispute
resolution mechanism, arbitration proceedings do not necessary rely on
intervention by national courts.89 As stated above, three Chinese institutions
have established their own investment arbitration rules and have offered to
administer arbitration cases based on UNCITRAL arbitration rules.
However, there are a plethora of other international institutions that can
86

Zhong Hua Ren Ming Gong He Guo Zhong Cai Fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法)
[Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China](promulgated by 8th Standing Meeting
National People’s Congress, August 31, 1994, effective September 1, 1995), English version
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm,
Article 2.
87 United Mexican States v. Metaclad, 5 ICSID Report 236, 246-7 (Supreme Court of
British Columbia, Canada 2 May 2001); Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic, 9 ICSID
Report 439, Case No. T 8735-01 (Svea Court of Appeal, Sweden 15 May 2003); BG Group
plc v. Republic of Argentina, 1 572 US 9, 15 (US Supreme Court 2014).
88 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Implementing the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China (No. 5
[1987] of the Supreme People’s Court, April 10, 1987)
89 Julian D M Lew, supra note 41.
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provide investment arbitration services, and parties with business in China
have many choices of both arbitration rules and entities to manage the
cases.
The most significant difference when commencing investment
arbitration in Mainland China is the involvement of the local national courts
in supporting the arbitral proceedings, including facilitating the
enforcement of interim measures. The relevant provisions are Article 101 of
The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017
Revision) (Chinese Civil Procedure Law), Articles 28 and 68 of the Chinese
Arbitration Law, and Article 2 of the Notice of the Supreme People’s Court
on several issues concerning the implementation of the Arbitration Law of
the PRC, which generally provide that disputants who are parties to an
arbitration proceeding administered by a Chinese arbitration institution can
apply to the Chinese courts at the location of the assets or dependents to
issue evidence and property security orders.90 First, the relevant Chinese
laws only confirm that Chinese courts can issue interim orders and are
silent on whether arbitral tribunals have the same authority. Therefore,
Chinese courts will not facilitate the enforcement of interim orders made by
arbitral tribunals that are in forms other than arbitral awards. In practice, if
the parties submit a request for interim measures to an arbitral tribunal or
institution, the parties are often directed to transfer their requests to the
competent Chinese courts instead of providing interim orders on their own.
Second, it is subject to debate whether the parties to an arbitration
proceeding administered by a foreign arbitration institution or an ad hoc
arbitration proceeding can submit requests for interim measures to the
Chinese courts. Without a clear delegation of such authority in Chinese
legislation, it is unlikely that Chinese courts will grant such requests. In
addition, if arbitral tribunals make interim orders in the forms of arbitral
awards, then the awards can be enforced according to the New York
Convention and relevant Chinese laws. However, as manifested in Article
26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and in other institutional
arbitration rules, arbitral tribunals can provide interim orders in the form of
temporary measures at any time prior to the issuance of the award that
finally decides the dispute.91 Thus, the support for enforcing interim
measures in investment arbitration cases provided for in Chinese law is
quite limited.
4.3. Enforcement
If the issue of arbitrability is not considered the most significant
obstacle to commencing non-ICSID investment arbitration in China, the
missing enforcement mechanism is likely the most problematic.
90 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Implementation of the Arbitration Law of the PRC (Fa Fa [1997]No.4)
91 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 26.
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Enforcement of non-ICSID investment arbitral awards in Mainland China
can encounter at least three problems: 1) the lack of a legal basis, 2) public
policy defenses, and 3) sovereign immunity.
1) Lack of a legal basis: As described above, China declared a
commercial reservation when signing the New York Convention, and the
SPC explicitly excluded investment disputes between investors and host
states from commercial arbitration, which leads to the simple outcome that
non-ICSID investment arbitral awards cannot be enforced in China based
on the New York Convention. Article 283 of the Chinese Civil Procedure
Law provides that requests for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards to
Chinese courts shall be decided in accordance with international treaties
concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or based on the
principle of reciprocity.92 If the New York Convention is deemed not
applicable, without any other governing international treaty, the
enforcement of non-ICSID investment arbitral awards in China must rely
on the national courts’ ambiguous interpretation of the principle of
reciprocity. Considering that there are no non-ICSID investment arbitral
awards involving Chinese parties that have been reported or enforced by a
foreign court, it is not likely that Chinese courts will grant enforcement
requests based on the principle of reciprocity.
2) Public policy defense and sovereign immunity: These two obstacles
are grounded on the same rationale that sovereign assets are immune from
enforcement and execution by any foreign authorities. The former defense
originated with Article 5 of the New York Convention, while the latter is
grounded in customary international law. Article 55 of the ICSID
Convention makes clear that the collection procedure in Article 54 shall not
“be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State
relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution.”93
Efforts have been made to reach an international consensus on the rules of
state immunity.94 To date, there are two conventions that provide rules on
state immunity: the European Convention on State Immunity (“ECSI”) and
the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property (“UNCSI”).95 Due to widely varying national legislations
regarding sovereign immunity, there are a limited number of states that
have signed these two conventions. In fact, the UNCSI has not even been
implemented due to an insufficient number of signatories. Without a
prevailing international interpretation of sovereign immunity, the national
laws of enforcement govern the enforcement of investment arbitral awards
92

Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Min Shi Su Song Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼
法) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2017 Revision)](promulgated
by 7th Standing Meeting National People’s Congress, April 9, 1991), Article 283.
93 ICSID Convention, Article 55.
94 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON STATE IMMUNITY, May 16, 1972, 1495 UNTS 181.
95 G.A. Res. 59/38, United Nations Convension on Jurisdiction Immunities of States and
Their Property (Dec. 02, 2004).
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rendered under both the ICSID and non-ICSID regimes. For example, the
United States promulgated the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to
codify state immunity,96 which was followed by the United Kingdom97,
Australia98, and others. It is also common for national courts to identify
national rules regarding sovereign immunity as a public policy that shall not
be violated in the enforcement process.99 Due to the limitations of this
research and the complexity of the immunity issue, this article does not
undertake a detailed examination of the various state immunity practices.100
In contrast to the ongoing transition from the absolute immunity doctrine to
the restrictive immunity doctrine in other states, under Chinese legislation
and in Chinese courts, states are absolutely immune from adjudication by
foreign authorities (jurisdictional immunity), and state assets are immune
from execution in any enforcement proceedings unless the involved states
waive such presumptive immunity.101 China has not codified a national law
to govern the issue of state immunity. The relevant provisions are
incorporated in various laws, such as the Chinese Civil Procedural Law, the
People’s Republic of China Regulations Concerning Diplomatic Privileges
and Immunities, and the People’s Republic of China Law on Enforcement
Immunity of Foreign Central Banks’ Property. In practice, national courts
located in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau have consistently
denied jurisdiction in cases with sovereign states as defendants, and the
country has also resisted foreign jurisdiction or refused to waive immunity
when it is designated as a defendant.102 The most recent instance was in
2011 in FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo, in which the Hong Kong Supreme Court ultimately denied
jurisdiction in a case between an American company and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo based on the Chinese National People’s Congress
Standing Committee’s consistent interpretation of Chinese policy on
absolute state immunity.103 Therefore, although the relevant national
provisions regarding sovereign immunity are not conclusive and explicit,
Chinese judicial practice continues to follow the absolute sovereign
immunity doctrine. Without an explicit waiver of enforcement immunity by
96
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states, Chinese courts will refuse to enforce non-ICSID arbitral awards
against any states.
4.4. Prospects and Resolution
China is experiencing a significant revolution in the arbitration area.
The SPC has published a series of judicial interpretations to alleviate and
resolve the limitations of the outdated Chinese arbitration legislation in its
rapidly growing arbitration market. Under the national “Belt and Road” and
Free Trade Zones policies, arbitration has been delegated the ambiguous
mission of resolving both commercial and investment disputes. The
revolution is reflected in the opening of Free Trade Zone ad hoc arbitration,
the expanding validity of arbitration agreements, the lifting of limitations
on services provided by foreign arbitration institutions, and the reforms to
judicial review and the enforcement of arbitral awards.104 Several legal
interpretations published by the SPC have exceeded what is allowed under
existing Chinese legislation and have caused intense discussion in the
arbitration community.105 In June 2018, the SPC established the
International Commercial Tribunal to hear qualified cases involving
international commercial issues to facilitate the “Belt and Road” policy and
the needs of Chinese citizens who are deeply involved in international
trade.106 The Chinese arbitration community is relying on the SPC to
continue its innovation and to lead the revolution toward investment
arbitration. Suggested measures include judicial interpretations regarding
jurisdiction under non-ICSID investment arbitration, explanations of
allowable interim measures, and interpretations of the scope of sovereign
immunity and enforcement of non-ICSID arbitral awards under the New
York Convention regime. Through the law revision process, the SPC’s
judicial interpretations can have immediate and significant effects on
initiating non-ICSID investment arbitration in China.
In addition, the concurrent expansion of investment arbitration
services provided by three Chinese arbitration institutions is not groundless.
First, both have attempted to designate Hong Kong as the default forum for
arbitration to avoid the application of unfavorable Chinese arbitration
104 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Centralized
Arbitration Judicial Review Cases (Fa [2017] No.152) (China); Relevant Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court on the Report of Arbitration Judicial Review Cases (Fa Shi [2017]
No. 21) (China); Relevant Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Handling
Arbitration Judicial Review Cases (Fa Shi [2017] No. 22) (China); Relevant Provisions of
the Supreme People’s Court on the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (Feb. 23, 2018) (China),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-81932.html (last visited September 19, 2018).
105
Id; Gao Xiaoli, Positive Practice of Chinese Courts in Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 5 LEGAL APPLICATION (2018), translated in http://cicc.court.
gov.cn/html/1/219/199/203/805.html.
106 Provisions of The SPC on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of the
International Commercial Tribunal (Fa Shi [2018] No.11) (China), translated in
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laws.107 Second, if the ultimate arbitral awards do not have to be enforced in
the territory of China but in a state that recognizes the restrictive sovereign
immunity doctrine, enforcement is feasible as long as the applicants can
locate qualified states’ assets that are used for commercial purposes.108
Therefore, currently, the potential clients of the investment arbitration
services provided by Chinese arbitration institutions are more likely to be
Chinese investors who wish to sue foreign host states rather than investors
who have disputes with China.
5.

CONCLUSION
Both the ICSID and the international arbitration system are dynamic
investment dispute resolution regimes that are evolving based on the rapidly
changing international trade and economic structure. Recently, the ICSID
proposed an amendment to its rules in response to a backlash and questions
about its arbitration system. Many arbitration institutions and international
entities are also devoted to expanding the investment arbitration market.
With their divergent procedural rules and enforcement regimes, the ICSID
and non-ICSID arbitration mechanisms meet different market demands in
resolving investment disputes. The varied non-ICSID arbitration services
provided by various institutions also enrich the investment dispute
resolution market. By actively reforming and internationalizing its
arbitration system, China can fulfill its ambition to play a more important
role in the new international economic world. However, existing Chinese
legislation and judicial practices still present formidable obstacles and
cause significant uncertainty in commencing non-ICSID investment
arbitration in China. The Chinese arbitration community expects the SPC to
provide further judicial interpretations to support non-ICSID arbitration
practice in China before unpredictable revisions of Chinese laws. Based on
the SPC’s innovations in Chinese arbitration in recent years, such
expectations are not groundless, but the fate of non-ICSID investment
arbitration in China has still yet to be revealed.

107

CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules, Article 28.
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as Barrier to the Enforcement of InvestorState Arbitral Awards: the Repoliticization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 211, 225-230 (2010); Olga Gerlich, State Immunity from Execution in
Collection of Awards Rendered in International Investment Arbitration: The Achilles’ Heel
of Investor-State Arbitration System? 26 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 47, 70-8 (2015); Alexis Blane,
supra note 44.
108

273

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

274

39:249 (2019)

